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Concrete was first used by the Romans at U:e time of the
supremacy of the Roman Republic, but Its use was quite limited,
and It has been only within the last thirty years that the use
of concrete has been extended to most Kinds of building construe -
tion.
Clay was probably the first material used In building the
structures of the ancients* This was followed by the lntrodu-
tion of stone and wood as building materials. In the use of these
materials economy was not an Important consideration, and the
structures were able to stand the use to which they were put
because of the excessive amount of material employed. When the
cost of the structure was considered and an attempt made for
economic construction, the builders encountered failures In the
using of these materials.
Wnen iron was first used in construction, economy was
considered to a certain extent, but there was always a large
allowance made for safety, and the structures withstood the
loads put upon them because of the unnecessarily large amount
of material used. When the most economic construction was con-
sidered, the properties of the material being unknown, many
failures were encountered until the more Important properties
of iron and steel were determined.
When concrete was first used, it was in such places as
floors and foundations where there was very little stress put
upon it. Concrete was useful because of its weight and wear-
ing qualities, and being easy to handle, it was more economical

than atone. In the tX ev elopement of construction work, concrete
was rut to many other U3es where It was under larger stresses.
Home of its important properties being undetermined, builders
who have used It, like those who first attempted to use stone
and wood economically, have encountered failures.
It Is the purpose in this thesis to compile Information
on failures of concrete as used In building construction. The
examples given are representative of the failures that were
due to some more or ] ess ordinary cause. In each case the
probable cause of the failure and any variance in the opinions
of reliable engineers who have investigated the failure are
stated. In conclusion are given the general causes of the fail-
ures and remedies suggested, if possible, to remove tnese causes
and thus decrease the number of failures.

3
Hi EXAMPLES OF PAILORE8
.
r. Ka stn: an KodaK 00 . Bull dine.
Of the many failures which have occurred In concrete
building construction, the failure of the Eastman Kodak Co.
building at Rochester, New York, Is one of the greatest, and
was due to a general cause which Is tne most common of all,
namely, carelessness in construction.
The failure of this building occurred November 21, 1906,
killing four men and severely Injuring several others. Tne
the
building was of^Kahn type of tile and reinforced concrete con-
st ruction. It had been designed and was being erected by the
Concrete Steel and Tile Construction Co. of Detroit, Michigan.
The structure had three stories for part of Its area, th-e main
floor being ten feet from the ground in this part and fourteen
feet elsewhere. Tne total height from the ground to roof was
about 28 ft. A plan and vertical section are shown in Fig. 1.
All of the building was of regular column, girder, and slab con-
struction, without unu sally long spans. The columns, floors, and
rocf were ofreinforced concrete, floors and roof having hollow
tile 12 ins. wide, incorporated in rows separated by concrete
beards u ins. wide, reinforced with Kahn bars and plain round
bars . The exterior walls were of brick . At the time of the
collapse, the frame work of -the building and much of the exterior-
brick work were completed, and waterproofing was being put on the
rocf.
The extent of the collapse was as follows: The roof and its
supporting columns fell for a space of about 53 ft. by 39 ft.
























5The main floor stood the snocK of the falling debris rithout
failure, except that a hole through It about 2 ft. square was
made by the end of a falling girder. The fallen floors broke
up Into a general wreck-heap of tile, concrete, and steel rods,
though large parts of the roof remained attached to the stand-
ing parts and hanging down in strips. columns and girders
fell and were In some cases undamaged.
In the case of one column which fell undamaged, tne rein-
forcing rods at the right end of the column were flush with the
concrete, showing that the column had no anchorage to trie floor
below. The- rods projecting from the left end were Imbedded
In the roof-girder which tore away from the column.
An examination of the ruins showed many evidence's of de-
fective workmanship and poor concrete* The condition of the
concrete in many places showed clearly that its surface had
been smoothed up with mortar to some extent after the. forms
were removed. Porous concrete was also in evidence.
The following is extracted from the report made to the
coroner by Mr. McClintock acting as an expert adviser:
"Many of the posts shew a norlzontal Joint of sawdust and
shavings and Paper which apparently dropped into the wooden
form before the concrete was put in above.
In many places steel bars snow at the surface of tne
girders on the side.
Tne fact that the main floor resisted the great shock of
falling girders, posts, and roof, without appreciable injury
Indicates that the general design was satisfactory. The only
Place broken In the main floor is where a roof girder slipped

from its bearing arid dropped one end 14 ft. to tne floor.
Trie general condition of tne building indicates tnat tne
cement was good and that ample time was given for setting before
the removal of the forms.
I saw many places In the posts and girders Where the cone
crete was not filled with mortar, and had the open texture of
a pop-corn ball, indicating tnat it was put into the moulds
in too wet a condition.
In many cases the steel bars in girders do not connect or
overlap over the posts. The fallen posts show that there was
no connection of the steel bars in the part of a post above a
floor and below and that there" were no dowels.
The condition of the wreckage indicates almost with cer-
tainty tnat col. 47 (See Fig. 1) failed first and below the
mezzanine floor."
The report stated that the stone used for making concrete
appeared to be of good quality, J to 1 in., with some screenings
left in; that none of the sand was left on the site, but that
the sand-pile location gave every opportunity for getting dirt
in with the sand and that some of the crumbling concrete indi-
cated dirty sand in spots.
There, was no question raised as to the sufficiency of the
shoring. The concrete of that part of the roof which failed
was about 17 or 13 days old. The concrete of Col. 47 was about
three weeKs old.
It was to this Col. 47 that the cause of the collapse was
charged. Tr e workigg blueprints showed that Col. 47 was wo be
IS x 18 ins. with eight reinforcing bars, but it was built

1? xir. ins. and with only four reinforcing bars. The report
also gave a computation of the loads on this column which showdd
that the dead load alone exceeded the allowable load .
In the report to the coroner the conclusion was given
that on account of the very nigh stresses tne design wss defect-
ive; that tne variations from the drawings showed faulty
construction; and that the weaK spots in the concrete , tne
honeycombed character of the concrete In tne lower part of many
columns, and the presence of leaves
,
sawdust, shavings, and
large biocKs of wood in the concrete, showed negligence in con-
struction ..
The vefdlct of the coroner, after a thorough investigation
charged the Concrete Steel and Tile Construction Co. with
criminal negligence, and the superintendent and engineer on the
construction work with gross and culpable negligence.
The coroner drew tne following conclusions of fact from the
evidence
:
"First- The tahn bars and similar bars witu shear members
attached are not suitable for columns, because of difficulty in
properly tamping the concrete.
"Second- No steel-concrete structure can be considered
safe unless some reliable man is absolutely responsible for put-
bars
ting the proper number of proper siaed in the positions desig -
nated for them.
"Third- The allowable stress upon steel and concrete in

construction should te fixed by law, so that the safety of the
public mil not depend upon the cupidity of energetic contract-
ors or Parsimonious designers."
After the report was made to the coroner by the ccLjr.lt tee
of experts which he appointed to Investigate trie failure, and
after tne coroner's verdict was given, the owners of the build-
ing engaged two consulting engineers experienced In concrete
worK to make a further investigation. Their report was as
follows:
nVe are Tally convinced that the primary cause of the fail-
ure was due to the fact that the supports under girders and floor
construction were removed too soon for that season of the year,
your records showing that the concrete was only about three weeks
old. The concrete throughout is of good quality but was too
green to enable the respective members to carry even their re-
spective dead loads with safety. Had the forms around the col-
umns and sides of the large beams been first removed, and the
supports under girders and floor construction been left undis-
turbed for a period of at least four weeks longer, it is our
opinion that you would not "nave experienced tne slightest
trouble.
We do not find that any abnormal or eccentric loading
exists.
The girders tributary to Col. 47 were constructed and exe-
cuted with ample factor of safety. We find that the total dead
and live load on Col. 47 was 600 lb. per sq. in; and using 750
lb. per sq. in. as a safe load, tnat the column was built with
an ample factor of safety.

We further submit the following report of actual test conductfl
on col. 43, which is constructed the same as Col. 47.
An area over thd column was loaded with tile such that the
total load on the column was 119,955 lbs. The column was de-
signed for a load of 107>000 lbs. , which shows that the test load




From an interview with an engineer who investigated the fail-
ure of the Eastman KodaK Co. building for the government, it was
found that the concrete was laid in weather witn an average tem-
perature of 39° F. and that the forms were removed about 20 days
after the concrete was placed in tne forms. With the low tem-
perature the concrete could not set very fast and it was green
when the forms were removed. Tests were made later on concrete
which was of the same Kind as that in the collapsed portion, and
it v/as found to be of a gooa quality.
Considering all the evidence, it would seem that the cause
of the failure was the premature removal of the forms.
For a more complete description of this fallure^see the
Engineering News of Jan. 3 and Jan. 31, 190 7.

2. Re so rvoir at Madrid , oPaln .
The failure of the Madrid reservoir occurred on April 3, 1905
As a result of the collapse 30 men were Killed and 60 Injured.
In general, the design of this reservoir consisted of ferro-
concrete columns 0.2s x 0.25 m. square and «3.'+0 m. high to the
springing of the arches, spaced 6.02 x 4.03m. apart from center
to center. The concrete was of portland cement with vertical
iron rods of 16 mm. diameter Imbedded, which at intervals of 0.25
m. were tied together with wire. The columns were supported
on bases of reinforced concrete into which they penetrated 0.08
m.j and the reinforcing rods simply rested on two flat bars Im-
bedded in the concrete base. The columns were constructed by
pouring the concrete into moulds of trie full height and tamping
with rammers having handles of necessary length. The covering
consisted of parabolic segmental arches of ferro-concrete 0.05m.
thicK, 5.77m. span and 0.58m rise, and rested on the columns.
Parallel with the arches, the columns were connected
below the springing by ferro-concrete beams 0.50m. deep, witn
a bar 37mm. in diameter imbedded in the bottom part to reinforce
in tension and three bars in the upper part of 15mm. diameter to
reinforce In compression. These upper and lower bars were con-
nected by vertical and diagonal rods of 4,5 and 6mm. diameter.
Beyond this, there was no tie in either direction between the
tall, slender columns, which were in 110 way attached at the foot
to the floor of the reservoir. imbedded in the concrete of tne
arches was a network composed of rods 12mm. diameter tied with
wire 6mm. diameter.

The portland cement used was manufactured In Spain and was
specified to resist In tension 425 lbs.after seven days and 500
lbs. after twenty-eight days. The cement complied fully with
the above requirements.
For the columns and arches the concrete was composed of a
mixture of 1 part of cement to k parts of sand. For the remaind-
er of the worK the mixture was reduced to 1 part of cement to 5
parts of sand.
on the day of the catastrophe the covering of No. 4 compart-
ment was practically terminated;: nothing was done to No. 3. and
about one-half of each of the two remaining compartments, Nos.
2 and 1 were covered.lt was the covering of No. k that collapsed.
It appeared that as a test the cover for a width of Mm. trans-
versly to butt across all the arches, had been loaded with a
thickness of about 0.30m. of sand, which, however, had been re-
moved. The next day a general collapse took place, which, from
the appearance and position of the fallen columns, seemed to have
commenced by the fourteenth row of arches from one side rising
at the crown and the columns on each side falling inward. Any
observations of value were made impossible for two reasons;
first, because of the absence of engineers from the Immediate
proximity of the collapse and second, because the great clouds
of dust made it impossible to see the falling mass. The laborers
who were working close by were unintelligent and frightened and
were unable to give any information of value.
One explanation of the collapse advanced was that with tne
official test load, now considered far too heavy, some arch or
arches sank at the crown and the adjoining ones rose, thus allow-
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ing the columns between them to deviate from the perpendicular.
When this had occurred the whole collapsed like a pack of cards.
In 'support of this explanation may be mentioned tne fact that many
of the columns after the accident snowed a sufficient deviation
line
from the straignt^to allow the vertical pressure to fall outside
the base. The ends of the arcnes over the sloped ends of the
compartment which did not come entirely to the ground, were some
of them quite flat, while others were quite pointed like the ridge
of a roof.
the
From the foregoing remarks
,
„ important points to be considered
in investigating the cause of failure, are summarized as follows;
(1) The excessive height of the columns as compared with their
dimensions.
(2) The absence of any connection between the reinforcing rods
of the floor and. columns,
(3) No Increase in the dimensions of the columns at the foot.
(4) The complete absence of any tie in either direction, ex-
cept the beams at the springing of arches, in tne shape
of lattice work, horizontal or diagonal ties, or the com-
plete filling in as abutment piers of a certain number of
spaces betwedn columns.
(5) Tne effects of temperature on the work.
The complete absence of ties between the columns made the
stability of the structure depend upon every part maintaining
perfect rigidity without the slightest deviation, for as soon as
one column moved it- allowed others to do the same and thus bring
on a general collapse.
The quality of the work was excellent, so the csuse of the fail-
ure must have been in the design.

After the above failure occurred tnere was another, which
threw considerable light upon the question. as to the causes.
During the latter part of the month of May the beans of com-
partments Nos. 1 and 2, where the arches nad not been completed,
so that the beams were exposed to the direct rays of the sum and
were not tied In place by the arches, commenced to bend to such
an extent that on June 2 the visible portion of the beam had be-
come serpentine in plan, in some cases extending over the whole
length exposed and in other ^confined to four or five spaces be-
tween the columns. In these latter cases deviation from a
straight line was as much as 0.50 or 0.60m. The heads of the
columns remained attached to the beams so that tne columns were
correspondingly drawn out of the perpendicular.
As the beams were constructed continuously over the two com-
partments, they had a total length of 178m. or aoout 550 ft.,
which made it quite evident that the question of expansion and
contraction caused by variations in temperature had not been
taXen into account in the design.
The ultimate result of the deformation of the beams was the
bringing down of some 200 of the columns in the first compart-
ment and the almost total destruction of all the concrete work
that had been completed.
From the temperature records it was round that there was a very
marked rise in temperature at the time of this last collapse. The
fact that this elevation in temperature coincided with the time
of the deviation of the columns and beams from the original
straight line and the subsequent collapse, leads one to believe
that this last collapse was due to the failure to design for

changes In temperature, and that the first collapse was due In
Part to the same cause, and In part to the excessive test load.
A more complete description of this failure can be found In
the Engineering Record of Ju]y 22, 1905.
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3. The Collapse of the Blxby Hotel .at Long Beach , Cal .
The Blxby Hotel collapsed while In the process of erection on
November 9, 1906, Killing ten men and injuring several others.
The binding was a six-story reinforced concrete structure,
in plan shaped like the letter H, built upon the beach with the
basement floor a few feet above extreme high tide, and the first
floor level with the top of the low bluff upon which the town of
Long Beach stands. The collapse occurred in the cross-bar of
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The vertical members of the structure were columns reinforced
with plain round rods, standing each on an Independent foundation
and extending In tiers, with a few except Ions, from "basement to
roof. The beams and floors were of the Kahn system of reinforced
concrete in combination with hollow tile and were built for the
following floor loads:
1st. floor, 150 lbs. per sq. ft. plus dead load. All other
floors 60 lbs. per sq. ft. Plus dead load.
The concrete was proportioned 1 part cement, 2 parts sand, 3
parts broken stone, and was machine mixed. The cement, sand, and
broKen stone were all of good quality. Tests were made on the
concrete and only a small percentage failed to pass. The finished
concrete as shown by the fractures of the wreckage was found to
"be of good quality.
The foundations were checked as to levels and were found to be
unmoved.
A panel of the Kahn flooring In the east wing was tested after
the wrecK with a load of 2h0 lbs. per sq. ft ., deflection f of an
Inch, clear span, 17 ft. 10 in. The panel tested was part of the
fifth floor and was twenty-eight days old when tested.
The fact that part of the third floor in the west wing stood
under the impact and weight of the wreckage of the fourth and
fifth floors, suggests, the floor construction being alike, that
without some contributory cause other than the fall of material
above, the floors should have stood everywhere else. The con-
crete in the fifth floor was eighteen days old, and the concrete
of the roof was being put in place when the collapse occurred.
The roof slab was '4- in. thick, reinforced with Ellwood wire
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fabric end J In. round rods. The beams were 3X1 # in. , spaced
8 ft. c. to c, reinforced with rods of the Kahn pattern.
The foregoing would appear to eliminate from the direct cause
of the accident, the materials, the foundation, and the floor
system, leaving the responsibility either upon the finished per-
manent columns, or upon the temporary wooden posts supporting
the roof construction, or upon both.
The coroner's Jury took the view that faulty construction
work was the cause of the collapse, finding in their verdict that
the collapse was occasioned by prematurely removing part of the
timbers supporting the fifth floor, and proceeding with construct-
ion of the roof before the cement beneath was properly cured.
The complete destruction of the various members of the. col-
lapsed portion, both by fall and by work of recovering the bodies
of those who were killed, hopelessly confused the cause and. effect
and rendered it Impossible to determine directly the member at
fault. The contractor and his superintendent were on the roof
when it fell. Their testimony :.t the coroner's inquest was that
the center of the building seemed to sink for about 12 ft. There
was no perceptible sound of an impact. It went down in the shape
of a howl. The theory of the contractor was that the break came
at about the first floor. The architect stated that in his
opinion some of the supports under the fifth floor may have been
removed too soon. The Immediate cause remained a matter for
logical deduction, and, to some extent, of individual opinion.
Another thing which snould have been considered in investiga-
ting the conditions, is brought out in a letter to trie Engineering
News which is here given.
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"It is only necessary to consider the H-form of trie plan of
the structure to realize the danger to which the structure would
become subject In case of an uneven settling of the foundation.
The concrete stair in the center will, owing to the nature of
the construction, afford an excellent distribution of the loads
under the center portion of the building, resulting In less In-
tensity of load on the foundations at this spot than under the
wing. It Is evident that any settling of the wings will cause
the center portion of the foundation to "become- the fulcrum for
the weights of the structure, and the tensile stresses that this
would give rise to in the upper floors would tear these floors
and cause them to slnK v dragging the columns with them.
The H-form is a most unfortunate choice for a building of any
Kind net erected on bed-rock."
From the evidence brought out in investigating the failure
of this building it appears that the collapse was due to the
premature removal of the forms supporting the concrete of the
fifth floor.
For further information on this failure, see the Engineering
News of November 29, 1906.
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4. Failure of a Reinforced Concrete Chimne y at Louisvill e
,
Ky.
The reinforced concrete chimney for a. notel at Louisville, Ky.
,
filled in January, 3V07, during a violent wind storm wnich had
been Mowing all day. The wind was blowing at the rate of 42
miles per hour from the southwest, on which side the chimney was
entirely exposed. The chimney had been completed about 2 years
at the time of the failure..
The chimney was 175 ft. high above tne ground; The lower 70
ft. of the chimney !}ad an outside diameter of 8k in. and consist-
ed of two concrete, shells 5 In. thick with a 5 In. space between
these shells. The upper 60 ft. was a single shell 6 in. thick
and 64 in. in diameter.
The reinforcing of the concrrete consisted of l6-i-$;Xli In. T-
bars arranged in pairs for the vertical reinforcement and IXIX^
jn.T-bars spaced about 2 ft. apart for the circumferential
reinforcement. There was no bond between the vertical and cir-
cumferential reinforcing rods.
The chimney failed at the lowest part of the 64 in. diameter
section . The failure occurred along one line only and the
structure above this line remained intact until it struck the
ground, when it was crushed Into fine Pieces. The concrete broke
loose from the reinforcing bars and left them clean indicating
that the bond was poor.
The concrete was composed or poi-tland cement and sand In the
proportion of l to 3. There were many vertical and horizontal
cracks on the surface of the concrete. Samples of the concrete
taken from the wreckage showed it to be soft and easily disinte-
grated. No reason for tills poor condition of the concrete was

found In the report.
The Interior of the collapsed shell was discolored to a dePUi
of an Inch, either from the heat or gases, which may have weaken-
ed It.. The steel of the reinforcing bars was free from rust and
comparatively few of the bars were broken by the collapse*
The lines between the 3 ft. vertical courses of the part left
standing were very clearly marked and were found to be more than
surface lines 3 indicating that the bond between the courses
was poor.
Assuming a wind pressure of 50 lbs. per sq. ft. on a normal
Plane, the compression in the concrete at the Place of rupture
was calculated to be M-80 lbs. per sq. in. For an ordinary qual-
ity of reinforced concrete this stress would be considered safe.
The fact that so few of the reinforcing bars were broken, in-
dicated that the reinforcement was sufficient.
The probable cause of the failure was the insufficient bond
between the concrete and reinforcing bars, which resulted from
the poor grade of concrete used In the structure.
For a more complete reference see the Engineering News of
February 7, 1907.

5. Con apse of Reinforced Concret e Building In Philadelphia , Pa.
A portion of the reinforced concrete building In process




collapsed on July 10, 1907, killing two men and Injuring
several others- The building was to nave been three stories
and a basement, and was nearlng completion, the concrete roof
being almost finished at the time of the collapse.
The columns, girders, beams, and slabs were of reinforced
concrete, round rods being used for reinforcement in columns and
beams, and expanded metal for the slabs-
Nearly half of the building went down , the roof falling
and striking the finished floors below until the first floor was
reached, a part of which remained standing, although its beams and
girders were cracked by the blow of the falling mass.
There were no specifications for the worK.The concrete
was a mixture of one part of Portland cement, two parts sand, and
four parts of crushed stone and gravel, the crushed stone being
used up to the third floor and gravel above the third floor. The
concrete appeared to be good and well mixed and suitable for the
purpose.
The forms used in the construction were poorly built. The
boards did not fit together tightly so as to make a good Joint,
and the struts supporting the girder and beam forms were light
and often spliced, so that they could easily bend out of position.
The alignment of the worK was poor. The columns did not center
over each* other and the lower sides of the beams and girders were
not only not level but were also sagged, showing that the forms

were not of sufficient stiffness. In general i the forms as con-
structed were very poor. The reinforcing bars were not spaced
with any regularity ana the expanded metal was not well spliced.
The. building was being rushed to completion with little
attention given to details. The contrac tor required the lumber
used in the forms in this building for the construction of another
building and was removing the forms as rapidly as possible. All
the forms for the roof were being removed when the concrete was
from five to seven days old, although the atmospheric conditions
were not favorable to rapid hardening of concrete. While the
laborers were removing the forms for the roof, the roof began to
sag and, finally coming down, struck the green concrete of the
third floor and carried with it the concrete of this floor and
portions of the first and second floors.
The contractor had ordered the removal of every second
strut used in the forms for the roof, but the foreman misunder-
stood and was removing all the struts when the collapse came.
Although very little attention was given to tthe details
of construction and the concrete was poorly finished, the probable
cause of the collapse was tne premature removal of the forms
supporting the roof.
A complete description of this failure Is given in the
Cement Age of August, 1907.
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6. The Failure of the Concrete Roof of a_ Filte r Plant,
Lawrence
, Massachusetts .
The failure of the concrete roof of the filter plant which
was being constructed for the city of Lawrence, Mass., occurred
on April 3, 1907, when the forms were being removed.
The filter consisted of a f-acre bed, 313x103 ft. m plan, built
of concrete in 15 ft. square bays of groined arches, both in the
floor and on the roof, which was later supported from the floor by
square Piers. The roof arches, of 15 ft. clear span, were 6 m..
thick at the crown and 22 In, at the Pier and were Intended to
carry a 3-ft. earth fill. All masonry was of reinforced concrete.
In construction the concrete was laid In three divisions, first,
the floor, with its groined arches, next, the columns, connected
to tna floor by two dowels of 1-ln.Plpe, and lastly, the roof of
groined arches resting upon the columns snd supported during con-
struction upon the usual centering.
Construction was started early in 1906 and continued up
to December 17th, when work was stopped because of the cold weath-
er. The last concrete work was done on December 17, but in all
the roof-work precautions were taken to prevent the concrete from
freezing. As soon as the concrete was laid in the roof bays,
they were covered with straw to a depth of 6 in. and later about
2 i ft. of sand and gravel was placed on top of the straw.
During the winter the centering under some of the bays
was removed, and on April 2, the day before the collapse, the re-
moval of .the centering under the remaining bays was commenced.
On the morning of April 3, the roof/started to break about the
middle of the structure, and the whole portion from that point to

the piers "last constructed collapsed. Subsequent examination
showed that many of the piers were bent out of plumb, but only
a few were overturned.
An examination of the concrete Immediately after the
collapse showed that it was soft and easily disintegrated. A
month later It was somewhat harder but still was not good con-
crete. The surface of the concrete was discolored In spots due
to the manure of the straw, and for a thlcXness of about 1 In.
the concrete was softer than the rest. The sand and gravel were
found to be dirty but not enough so to have a bad result.
The specifications required the contractor to leave the
centering under each bay of the roof until the five next succeed-
ing bays had been placed. The Contractor supposed that' this
provision was made to give plenty of time for the concrete to set,
and therefore after the concrete had been in Place for three
months through the winter, he removed all the centering, regard-
less of the condition of the bays ahead. The purpose of this
specification was to provide dead load to resist the thrust of
the arches of the roof.
The causes of the collapse are probably found in the
weakness of the concrete due to the low temperature which re-
tarded hardening, and In the unbalanced thrust of the arches. If
the centering had been allowed to remain until a period of warm
weather had given the concrete sufficient hardness, the collapse
would very liKely have teen averted.
For a more complete description see the Engineering
News of Feb. 27, 1908.
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III. DISCUSS ION OF CAUSES AND RXMIiDIftG .
From the Investigation of notable failures of concrete
structures, of which the more Important examples are herein des-
cribed, It Is found that the general causes of failure can be
Placed under the following neads; viz. poor workmanship, poor
design, or lack of responsibility.
In those cases In which a poor grade of concrete was partly
or wholly responsible for the failure, It was found that the con-
crete was poor because it was not thorougniy mixed or because
foreign ingredients that tended to weaken the strengtn of the
concrete were not kept out of the sand and broken stone. It was
found that in some cases dirt became mixed with the sand and
gravel wnile they were still in the pile. Investigation of some
of the failures showed tnat shavings and sticks that had fallen
into the forms in tne interval between tne laying of successive
layers of concrete had not been taken out. These defects can be
attributed to poor workmanship. The concrete would have been
of good quality if tnere had been good workmanship.
In some cases the failure of a concrete structure was attrlb
uted to poor design.. The H-pian of tne Bixby Hotel was not
considered a good design because any uneven settling of the
foundations would nave caused higher stresses in tne concrete
than had been calculated. In some of the structures, beams and
columns were not as large as they should have been, the working
stresses used being as high as 700 lb. per sq. in. In the
Madrid Reservoir, the beams were continuous, with no expansion
Joints to allow for expansion due to temperature changes. The
result was an increase in the stress due to a rise in temperature
for which no Increase In the size of beam had been made.
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A very ociiir.ion cause of failure , which seems to be the
most uncalled for, was the lacx of responslblli ty . The men who
had the work In Charge did not. maKe the ] aborers Know the Impor-
tance of thoroughly mixing the concrete and of Keeping out rub-
bish. Further, the foremen did not see that their orders were
carried out, particularly as to how and when the forms were to
be removed. The failure of the Eastman XodaK Co. building and
of the Lawrence Filter Plant were attributed to the premature
removal of the forms. The removal of these forms wnlle the
concrete was still green resulted directly from the employment
of unskilled and irresponsible foremen.
The inspectors did not see that the specifications were fol-
lowed. They allowed the workmen to patch up bad spots where the
concrete had not been well tamped or where trie reinforcing bars
showed, before they had Inspected the finished work. After the
crevices had been patched up, it was impossible to Judge whether
or not the defect would weaken the strength of the member enough
to make it unsafe.. The investigation of the failure of the
Eastman Kodak Co. building showed that the inspectors did not
examine the condition of the concrete before it was laid, or the
condition of the forms before the concrete was placed. Foremen
and Inspectors were not employed that had enough experience in
concrete work or that were fit to be intrusted with responsibili-
ty.
It is seen that the failures were not unavoidable, and could
have been prevented by strict supervision and by the employment
of experienced and reliable men.
Poor workmanship can be prevented by making the laborers
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Know the importance of good worK. The laborers should be Instruct-
ed how to ic their worK properly. Foremen and Inspectors
should be employed that will give close supervision to the v,orx.
Poor design can toe remedied only toy putting the proposed worK
In the hands of competent designers. The designers should have
practical experience in a subordinate position and a technical
education upon which to "base tnelr Knowledge. They should toe
informed on the tests that nave teen made. The different for-
mulas that are used for calculating the sizes of toeams and columns
give different results and also vary from the results obtained toy
practical tests. The designer should Know how much allowance
to maKe ^or these variations. Better qualified designers might
toe obtained toy requiring that an engineer pass an examination in-
tended to test his qualifications as regards experience and tech-
nical education, to obtain a license without which he would not
toe allowed to act as the responsible designer.
The lacK of responsible men can only be overcome toy paying
tetter wages and toy using the utmost care in the selection of
foremen and inspectors If reDla'cle foremen are employed they
will see that their orders in regard to the removal of the forms
are carried out. To assist in Knowing when the forms can be
removed, blocKs of the same concrete might be made and allowed to
set under the same conditions as the concrete in the structure.
These blocKs should te tested, and wnen they snow sufficient
strength, the foreman Will Know that the concrete has set enough
to permit the removal ©f the forms. A responsitole foreman or in-
spector will examine the surface of the concrete as soon as part
of the forms are removed and if he finds that the concrete is

stli] green, he will postpone the remoYal of the forms.
Inough Inspectors should re employed to Insure that all tne
worK can receive Its share of Inspection. As soon as It Is found
that the men on the work are not reliable, tney should te discharg
ed. Tf the men on the worfc realize tiiat they must follow orders
ar.d specifications or lose their positions, they will pay much
closer attention to the worK that they have to perform.
There should not be divided responsibility. Under existing
conditions, the producer of the material, the signer, the
builder, and the owner, each in turn blames the other for the
failure, and seldom anyone Is punished by the law
t
There snould
be 3 aws passed whereby the one at fault could be determined by an
investigating committee and a suitable penalty exacted from the
responsible party. If this is done, each party will do his test
to fulfill his part and employ men who are reliable.

IV. GOHpLtJSIOi;
In the preceding discussion, the principal means nave boon
given for the prevention of failures of reinforced concrete
structures.. Of the remedies suggested, the increase in Wages
of foremen and Inspectors to secure better supervision could be
easily accomplished and would increase the cost of concrete con-
struction only a slight amount. Gome of the other remedies would
cause a slight additional expense. Most of the remedies could be
applied by requiring a little extra effort on the part of those
already on the worK and without any additional cost.
By the use of the means suggested for preventing failures of
reinforced concrete structures, at a moderate increase in cost,
the number of such failures can be greatly reduced.
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